We prove that achieving adaptive security from composing two general non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions is impossible if and only if a uniform-transcript key agreement protocol exists.
Introduction
One of the central questions in cryptography is the question of composition, which very broadly is the study of various ways to compose several basic primitives in a way that amplifies the hardness of the composed object. Naturally, this central question has received a lot of attention in various settings and we continue the study of this question here. More specifically, we investigate a question of whether a composition of pseudo-random functions, to be defined shortly, constitutes stronger security by utilizing the security of the component functions. We consider two very natural types of conventional compositions: a parallel composition with respect to Exclusive-Or (XOR) operation denoted by ⊕ and a sequential composition. Briefly, on input in the domain of F and G, the parallel XOR-composition of two functions F and G is defined as F( ) ⊕ G( ). The sequential composition of F and G is defined as G(F( )) (or F(G( ))).
Seemingly unrelated to the notion of security amplification via composition, there is the question of designing Key Agreement protocol. Recall that Key Agreement (KA) is a protocol that enables two parties to generate a secret string (also called key) by communicating with each other over an insecure channel in the presence of a eavesdropping adversary. Uniform-transcript key agreement (UTKA) is a strengthened version of key agreement in which messages between two parties are indistinguishable from uniform distribution by all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries. The reason why key agreement seems unrelated to the security of composition is that key agreement belongs to the world of public-key cryptography (also known as "cryptomania") whereas the security of composed pseudo-random functions rather belongs to the world of private-key cryptography (also known as "minicrypt"). For further discussion on cryptomania and minicrypt, see [Imp95] . Now, let us recall briefly recall the definition of Pseudo-Random Functions (PRF) [GGM86] . There are two notions of security of PRF: adaptive security and non-adaptive security. Intuitively, a (pseudo-random) function is said to be non-adaptively secure if the function is indistinguishable from a random function against all PPT adversaries that evaluate the function on inputs chosen independently of the function outputs, that is, chosen prior to PPT adversary learning any of the outputs. Adaptive security is a far stronger notion of security than non-adaptive security: a PRF is said to be adaptively secure if the function remains indistinguishable from random function against all PPT adversaries preparing the current query based on the outputs of the function on all previous queries. Clearly, adaptive security implies non-adaptive security.
We show that the equivalence between the impossibility of achieving adaptive security by composing general non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions and the existence of uniform transcript key-agreement protocol. We note that our impossibility result holds not only for the case in which the non-adaptively-secure component functions are drawn from the different function families (also known as the general composition) but also for the case where the component functions are drawn from the same function family (also known as self-composition).
Related Work
There has been extensive research on relationship between the security of component functions and the security of their parallel or sequential composition. In the information theoretic context, Vaudenay [Vau03] proved that if F is a pseudo-random permutation with security against any distinguisher making (non-)adaptive queries, then the sequential composition of F's has improved security 2 −1 against a (non-)adaptive distinguisher. F only needs to be a function instead of a permutation for the same security in parallel composition. Luby and Rackoff [LR86] show the similar security amplification result in the computational context.
In the information theoretic setting, Maurer and Pietrzak [MP04] proved that composition of non-adaptive secure functions amplifies its security to security 2 (1+ln( −1 )) against an adaptive distinguisher. In 2007, Maurer et al. improved this bound to 2 [MPR07] . Myers [Mye04] showed that the existence of oracles relative to which there are non-adaptively secure permutations, but where the composition of such permutations fails to achieve adaptive security. Recently, Pietrzak [Pie05] showed that the composition of non-adaptively secure functions does not imply adaptive security under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Pietrzak's more recent work [Pie06] showed that if sequential composition does not imply adaptive security, then there exists a key agreement protocol. Moreover, it turns out that Pietrzak's construction in [Pie06] implies a slightly stronger result: that his key agreement protocol satisfies the property of uniform-transcript. Thus, we can restate the Pietrazak's result as follows: Theorem 1. [Pie06] If sequential composition of pseudo-random functions is not adaptively secure, then there exists a UTKA.
Our Results
Pietrzak's work left open the question of establishing the precise connection between the impossibility of adaptively secure composition and key agreement. Our main contribution is to establish sufficient and necessary conditions. In particular, we prove that the existence of UTKA implies the impossibility of obtaining an adaptively secure function from composing general non-adaptively secure functions. The main technique is the fully black-box construction of counter-example functions from UTKA. Therefore, our result holds with respect to any UTKA without relying on the actual code of the UTKA. We prove our result in both parallel and sequential compositions.
Theorem 2. If there exists a UTKA, then parallel composition of non-adaptively secure pseudorandom functions does not imply a pseudo-random function with adaptive security.
Theorem 3. If there exists a UTKA, then sequential composition of non-adaptively secure pseudorandom functions does not imply a pseudo-random function with adaptive security.
We also prove the analog of Pietrzak's Theorem 1 for parallel composition:
Theorem 4. If a parallel composition of speudo-random functions is not adaptively secure, then there exists a UTKA.
Putting all our results together with Theorem 1, we conclude the equivalence between the impossibility of adaptively secure composition and the existence of a uniform transcript key-agreement (both for parallel and sequential compositions). This is informally stated as follows.
Theorem 5. (MAIN)
The composition of two non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions does not imply an adaptively secure pseudo-random function if and only if a UTKA exists.
We emphasize that our main theorem holds regardless of whether PRFs being composed are taken from a single function family (called self-composition) or from two distinct function families (called general-composition). In particular, we show that the impossibility of secure generalcompositions further implies the impossibility of secure self-compositions. The precise connection between the impossibility of adaptively secure composition and a UTKA protocol were not known prior to our work. We summarize these previously known results and our contributions in Figure  1 .
Organization of the rest of the paper: In Section 2, we review all basic cryptographic notions and definitions. To build the intuition of our main construction, we first show in section 3 a high Figure 1 : Relationship between composition insecurity and other assumptions level outline of somewhat weaker result. In particular, we outline the analogue of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 not assuming UTKA, but rather assuming the existence of a family of enhanced trapdoor permutations. We note that even this weaker variant of our main result is a generalization from the result by [Pie05] , which relies on a specific assumption (i.e., DDH assumption). In Section 4, we proceed to give the intuition of our main result assuming UTKA. In Section 5, we discuss the implications of out main results on the impossibility of adaptively secure self-composition.
Preliminaries
We let ∈ ℕ be a security parameter. An algorithm is considered efficient if its computation can be carried out by a PPT machine whose running time is expected polynomial in the input length. We use the notation ← $ {0, 1} when string is uniformly drawn from {0, 1} . For further discussion on the following definitions and notions, see [Gol01] .
Definition 1 (Negligible and Overwhelming). A function : ℕ → ℝ is negligible if for every > 0 there exists an such that for all > , ( ) ≤ 1/ . On the other hand, 1 − is said to be overwhelming in .
Definition 2 (Non-negligible). A function : ℕ → ℝ is non-negligible if for every > 0 there exists infinitely many such that ( ) ≥ 1/ .
Definition 3 (Noticeable).
A function : ℕ → ℝ is noticeable if for every > 0 there exists an such that for all > , ( ) ≥ 1/ .
Definition 4 (Polynomial Indistinguishability). Two probability ensembles = { } ∈ℕ and = { } ∈ℕ are polynomially indistinguishable if for every Probabilistic Polynomial-Time (PPT) algorithm (distinguisher) , there exists a negligible function such that: for all random coin tosses and ′ of ,
Definition 5 (Pseudo-Random Function (Permutation)). Given a randomly chosen key ∈ for a key space K, an efficiently computable keyed function : × {0, 1} → {0, 1} is called pseudo-random function (PRF), if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm (distinguisher) , given access to the function and a uniform random function : {0, 1} → {0, 1} and for all n, there exists a negligible function (n) such that: for all random coin tosses and ′ of ,
In addition, if F is one-to-one and onto for all , then we call a pseudo-random permutation (PRP).
Definition 6 (Distinguishing Advantage). Given a polynomial-time distinguisher ( , ), which runs in time and makes at most queries to the oracle O (i.e., a pseudo-random function F) or random function R, we define the advantage of ( , ) as: for all random coin tosses and ′ of ,
A distinguisher is a non-adaptive distinguisher if it makes all the queries before it receives the output. Otherwise, we call it an adaptive distinguisher.
Definition 7 (Non-Adaptive Versus Adaptive Security). A pseudo-random function is nonadaptively secure if, for all polynomial-time non-adaptive distinguisher ( , ), there exists a negligible function such that Adv O ( , ) ≤ . On the contrary, we say a pseudo-random function is adaptively secure if, for all polynomial-time adaptive distinguisher ( , ), there exists a negligible function such that Adv O ( , ) ≤ .
Definition 8 (Parallel and Sequential Composition).
The parallel XOR-composition of two functions F and G, denoted as F ⊕ G, is the operation that composes the output value of F and G over the bit-wise Exclusive-Or (XOR) operation. The sequential composition of F and G, denoted as F ∘ G, is the operation that applies two functions sequentially, i.e.,
Informally, a dense trapdoor permutation family is a trapdoor permutation family with a polynomially dense public description of permutation so that a public description is indistinguishable from uniform random [SP92, Hai04] .
Definition 9 (Dense Trapdoor One-Way Permutation (DTP)). The algorithm triplet (Gen, , −1 ) is a family of dense trapdoor permutations if the following hold:
• Gen(1 ) is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm such that on input 1 , it outputs a pair of two strings ∈ {0, 1} and , where | | ≤ ( ).
• Given , algorithm : {0, 1} → {0, 1} is a polynomial-time computable permutation.
• Given , algorithm −1 is a polynomial-time computable inverse permutation of . That is, −1 ( ( )) = is efficiently computable for all ∈ {0, 1} .
• For all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm , the following holds for any ( , ), ∈ {0, 1} , for all random coin toss of ,
where ( ) is a negligible function in .
• For all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm , there exists a negligible function such that, given access to function Gen(1 ) or uniform function as oracle: for all random coin tosses and ′ of ,
Definition 10 (Hard-Core Predicate). A polynomial-time computable function family B : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → {0, 1} is a hard-core predicate of one-way function f if, for every probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm and for all ∈ {0, 1} , there exists a negligible function such that
Goldreich and Levin [GL89] presented the simple construction of hardcore predicate B( , ) from any one-way function as = ⊕ , as usual, denoted as = < , >, the inner product of two vectors.
Definition 11 (Bit Agreement (BA)). Informally, a bit agreement is a protocol in which two parties, Alice and Bob, secretly agree on a bit at the end. Formally, upon the security parameter as a common input, Alice and Bob output a bit and , respectively. Then, the protocol is said to have the correlation ( ) if for all ,
And the protocol is also said to be ( )-secure if, for all and for any PPT adversary Eve, given the security parameter and the entire transcript (denoted by Trans) between Alice and Bob,
If Alice and Bob exchange messages during the execution of the bit agreement protocol, it is called a -pass bit agreement. Note that Alice and Bob output the same bit with overwhelming probability, and Eve can compute the bit with only negligible advantage over merely guessing it, as and are overwhelming.
A key agreement protocol is one where two parties, Alice and Bob, given as a common input, secretly agree on a key in {0, 1} at the end of execution. The key agreement is known to be achieved by polynomially many parallel or sequential executions of the bit agreement protocol if the protocol has a noticeable and an overwhelming [Hol05] . Notice that the parallel repetitions of bit agreements achieve the -bit key agreement without increasing the round complexity. See [Hol05] and [Hol06] for further details. By one round, we mean a unit process wherein Alice receives, computes and sends a message to Bob, and then Bob receives, computes and sends a message to Alice. Thus, a -round key agreement( -KA) implies a 2 -pass key agreement. A -round uniformtranscript key agreement( -UTKA) is a -KA whose transcripts are indistinguishable from uniform distribution.
Definition 12 ( -round (Uniform-Transcript) Key Agreement Φ ( -(UT)KA)). For ≥ 1, around key agreement (exchange) protocol Φ consists of two sub-protocols, Alice (A) and Bob (B), denoted as Φ = (A, B). Let and be the th round messages of A and B respectively. Let Tran A be the transcript of all the messages up to the th round from B as Tran A = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) and Tran B = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ). Then, A consists of a family of message-generating algorithms A 1 , A 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , A +1 defined as follows. For A's random value A ∈ {0, 1} :
The definition of B is identical to the definition of A except that all A's and 's are replaced with B's and 's. Finally, Φ = (A, B) satisfies the following conditions: 2. At the end of execution of Φ, A and B agree on a secret . Formally, let ( ) be a negligible function in , then,
3. For the -round key agreement Φ to be a -round uniform-transcript key agreement, denoted as Φ , the additional condition below is satisfied. For any PPT adversary ,
where ( ) is a negligible function in . B satisfies the same requirement. That is, no PPT adversary distinguishes the messages of A and B from uniform distribution.
Building intuition: Composition Insecurity vs. Dense Trapdoor Permutation
For gentle introduction to our main result, we first present a special case of our main result as an example − The existence of dense trapdoor permutation (DTP) implies the impossibility of achieving the adaptive security by composing (in a black-box way) non-adaptively secure pseudorandom functions. The main idea behind showing this, is that a family of DTPs is well-known to provide a 2-pass (uniform-transcript) key agreement. A 2-pass key agreement can be achieved by parallel repetitions of an underlying 2-pass bit agreement without increasing its round complexity, which we describe as follows. Suppose that we are given a family of DTPs, (Gen(⋅), , −1 ). Without loss of generality, Alice first chooses a pair of one-way permutation and its inverse permutation −1 by computing a public encryption information and its private corresponding trapdoor information using Gen(⋅). Note that is computationally indistinguishable from a random string of the same length by the property of DTPs. Alice sends the public key to Bob. Upon from Alice, Bob chooses two strings and . Bob encrypts with , so let = ( ). Bob sends and to Alice and computes the secret bit = <x, r>. With and , Alice obtains by inverting as = −1 ( ). Then, Alice achieves the bit agreement by computing = <x, r>. Notice that all the messages exchanged between Alice and Bob are either a uniformly random string of length (i.e., and ) or pseudo-random strings indistinguishable from uniform (i.e., ). Thus, the above bit agreement is a uniform-transcript bit agreement. Hence, the parallel repetitions of the 2-pass bit agreement achieve a 2-pass -bit key agreement described in Protocol 1. 1 1 We remark that the same randomness can be used for all of parallel repetitions of bit agreement instead of using different ′ for each of bit agreements. However, this will complicate our exposition later on, so we will use different 's. Clearly this does not affect the security of resulting key agreement protocol.
Protocol 1: 2-pass key agreement based on a DTP (Folklore)
Parallel Composition Insecurity from Dense Trapdoor Permutation
We construct two counter-example pseudo-random functions F and G which are secure against any PPT adversary non-adaptively. Then, we prove that their parallel composition is not secure against a particular sequence of four adaptive queries.
Intuitions of Parallel Composition of F and G
We provide the high-level overview and intuition of our construction of pseudo-random functions F and G based on DTP, and show how to break the adaptive security of their parallel composition. The main technique of our constructions of counter-example functions is to design the functions to detect the adaptive query throughout the input and output behavior. In particular, F and G emulate a 2-pass key agreement protocol (described in Protocol 1) via adaptive inputs and outputs. Once F and G internally obtain a shared key, they generate outputs which hide a special relation with respect to the shared key. As we input these specially generated outputs to the parallel composition again, F and G retrieve the previously shared key and verify the special relation with respect to the shared key. Hence, function F and G are convinced that the queries must be indeed adaptively generated, and reveal their private keys through their outputs, which break their security. Our counter-example functions F and G are both defined over ({0, 1} ) 2 +3 . F and G hide the secret keys F and G respectively. P denotes an adaptively secure pseudo-random permutation. Let (Gen(⋅), , −1 ) be a family of DTPs. and denote the th pseudo-random string generated by F and G using their secret keys on th input respectively. In addition, Enc ( ) is defined to be a pseudo-random private-key encryption of with respect to key . Hence, we have = Dec (Enc ( )).
We first define F and G on the first fixed adaptive query 1 = (0 , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ):
• F generates 2 + 3 pseudo-random strings * , 21 , 31 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (2 +3)1 computed by P F ( 1 ).
• G on input 1 uses its secret key to first compute sufficiently long pseudo-random string which is then used to compute DTP pair ( , ): a pair of a DTP key and its private trapdoor by Gen(1 ) of DTP. G generates 2 + 2 pseudo-random strings 21 , 31 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (2 +3)1 by P G ( 1 ), then it outputs ( , 21 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (2 +3)1 ).
We describe the outputs of F and G and their parallel composition outputs below:
The second adaptive query is of the form 2 = ( , 0 , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ) where = * ⊕ . We define F and G on 2 as follows.
• F first simulates the first-round of computation (by internally executing P F on the fixed query 1 ) to obtain * , then computes ⊕ * which is equal to ; Now, F computes 2 + 3 pseudorandom strings 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , and ( +1)2 , ( +2)2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (2 +3)2 by P F ( 2 ). F computes by ( ) for 1 ≤ ≤ , then outputs ( 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , ( +1)2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (2 +3)2 ).
• G generates fresh pseudo-random strings ( 12 , 22 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (2 +3)2 ) computed by P G ( 2 ).
We describe what both F and G output individually and the output of their parallel composition:
We define the third adaptive query 3 to consist of the selected coordinates in the previous outputs
we defined F and G as follows.
• F regenerates all the pseudo-random strings in the second round,
where F can obtain ⊕ * from 3 . F can compute =< , ( + )2 > for all 1 ≤ ≤ and retrieve a shared key sk by letting sk =
2 as it cancels 12 , 22 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (2 )2 out of the first 2 coordinates in 3 . By using the inverse permutation −1 with respect to the trapdoor , G can obtain by computing −1 ( ) for all i. Hence, G can compute =< , > for all i and retrieve the shared key sk by letting sk = 1 2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ . Then, G generates pseudo-random strings 13 , 23 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (2 +3)3 by P G ( 3 ) and creates an encryption Enc sk ( 13 ). Finally, G outputs (Enc sk ( 13 ), 13 , 23 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (2 +2)3 ).
Below we depict the individual outputs of F and G and the output of their parallel composition:
Our fourth query 4 is a selective collection of the outputs in the previous round such that
Notice that F and G can simulate all the computations of previous rounds upon 4 . Hence, F and G can retrieve shared key sk. F computes Enc ( 13 ) and 13 by the simulation of computations on 3 . Then, F checks to see if equality Dec (Enc ( 13 ) ⊕ (Enc ( 13 ) ⊕ Enc ( 13 ))) = 13 ⊕ ( 13 ⊕ 13 ) holds where (Enc ( 13 ) ⊕ Enc ( 13 )) and ( 13 ⊕ 13 ) are obtained from 4 . Since the equality holds, F deduces that the input query is indeed an adaptive query. Hence, F outputs ( F , 0 , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ) containing its secret key F . G does the same and outputs (0 , G , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ). The individual outputs of F and G and the output of the parallel composition are described below.
We first provide the specifications of the underlying primitives used for the construction of F. We have˜ :
where is the key space of˜ .˜ denotes a PRP with respect to private key and˜ −1 is the inversion permutation to˜ . We are also given PRP : × {0, 1} → {0, 1} . Notice that both˜ and have the same key space . Without loss of generality, is {0, 1} throughout this paper. Finally, we are given a family of DTPs, (Gen(⋅, ⋅), , −1 ). We denote and −1 as a permutation and its inverse permutation defined over {0, 1} where ( , ) is generated by Gen(1 , ) for randomness ∈ {0, 1} and | | = and | | = ( ). Built on the above underlying primitives, the counter-example function F is defined to be from ({0, 1} ) 2 +3 to ({0, 1} ) 2 +3 and internally hides a secret F in , which is a private key applied to the underlying primitives in order to generate pseudo-random. Let = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , 2 +3 ) be an input vector to F where ∈ {0, 1} for = 1, 2, . . . , 2 + 3. Similarly, ( 1 , 2 , . . . , 2 +3 ) denote an output vector. The formal construction of F is given in Algorithm 1.
Claim 3.1. The function F is secure against any non-adaptive PPT adversary ( , ), running in time and making at most non-adaptive queries, where t and q are any polynomials of security parameter n.
Proof. For clarity in the following proof, we denote as the th randomness at the th query. To prove the non-adaptive security of F, we will show that
where ′ = + ( , ), accounting for the extra time costs resulting from our reduction. Assume that non-adaptive adversary chooses queries as follows. The first query is 1 = ( * , 0 , . . . , 0 ) ∈ ({0, 1} ) 2 +3 and the rest of − 1 queries are = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , (2 ) , * , 0 , 0 ) for 2 ≤ ≤ , in which 1 , 2 , . . . , (2 ) are arbitrarily chosen for all . Notice that in cases 1 and 2 of Algorithm 1, once we fix the first coordinate of 1 and the (2 + 1)th coordinate of 's to be equally * , we actually fix the shared key ′ through all the queries, so that the first coordinate is an encryption of the second coordinate by ′ in the last − 1 outputs. Hence, inverting the first coordinates of output on 1 will reveal the key ′ , and consequently distinguishes F from a uniform function R. Since any PPT adversary can invert only with at most negligible probability , the probability of retrieving ′ is at most ( ) , constituting the first term on the right-hand side (RHS) of inequality (1).
Assume that makes queries in the form of ( 1 ∕ = 0 , 2 ∕ = 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 2 +3 ∕ = 0 ), corresponding to case 3 and fixes the first 2 + 1 coordinates of all the queries. So, fixes ′ , 1 , and in the condition
only needs to find a pair of 2 +2 and 2 +3 satisfying the condition so that F reveals its secret key F . Since is a permutation, there exists unique 2 +3 to each 2 +2 , which satisfies the condition. Hence,
With queries, successfully guesses F with probability at most /2 ; that is the second term on the RHS of the inequality.
Consider that makes queries such that each input query falls into either case 3 or 4 of Algorithm 1. Since we already showed above that F in the case 3 outputs only pseudo-random strings computed by˜ F with an overwhelming probability, we ignore the case that F outputs the Construction of F
4. If is not of any previous cases, then
Algorithm 1: The algorithm of function F secret key F on one of the queries. Then, F simply outputs a vector of pseudo-random strings generated by PRP˜ F on each input query, which is indistinguishable from uniform randoms of ({0, 1} ) 2 +3 . This constitutes Adv˜ ( , ′ ) in inequality (1). Consider the case in which makes non-adaptive queries in which one of the queries is (0 , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ), so it evokes case 4 and the rest of queries evoke case 1 of Algorithm 1. Towards a contradiction, assume that distinguishes the outputs corresponding to the non-adaptive input queries described above. The output of case 4 is indistinguishable from uniform random by the security of PRP˜ F . This implies that distinguishes the outputs of case 1 from uniform randoms. Notice that the first coordinates of an output of case 1 are strings generated in the following way.
F on an input query first generates pseudo-random strings and then a trapdoor permutation 1 ⊕ 1 re-encrypts these pseudo-random strings where 1 ⊕ 1 is known since can obtain 1 from the output of F on (0 , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ). The rest of coordinates (all coordinates except for the first coordinates) are strings generated only by˜ F on an input query. We recall the description of the output of case 1 on input query ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 2 +3 ) as follows:
the rest of coordinates )
where
Since distinguishes these outputs of case 1 from uniform randoms, either of the following cases must be true. First, distinguishes outputs of case 1 from uniform randoms by distinguishing the first coordinates of the outputs from uniform randoms. Then, can also distinguish outputs of case 4 from uniform randoms as follows. Upon outputs of case 4, applies 1 ⊕ 1 to the first coordinates of each output and ignores the rest of coordinates of each output. This forces the distribution of the outputs of case 4 to be identical to the distributions of the outputs of case 1 that distinguishes from uniform randoms. Therefore, distinguishes outputs of case 4 from uniform randoms. This leads to a contradiction to the nonadaptive security of F in case 4 already proven above. Then, it must be true that distinguishes outputs of case 1 from uniform randoms by distinguishing the rest of coordinates of outputs from uniform randoms. However, this also enables to distinguish outputs of case 4 from uniform randoms by ignoring the first coordinates of each output. Hence, another contradiction arises to the non-adaptive security of F in case 4. Since we encounter contradictions in both cases, the advantage of making non-adaptive queries of case 1 is also upper-bounded by Adv˜ ( , ′ ) in inequality (1).
Finally, consider that makes queries of case 2 in Algorithm 1. Towards a contradiction, assume that distinguishes theses outputs from uniform randoms. Notice that the distribution of the last 2 + 1 coordinates in output vectors (all the elements except for the first two elements) is equivalent to the distribution of the last 2 + 1 coordinates of an output of case 4. This is due to that both distributions are generated by˜ F on input queries. We already showed above that if distinguishes outputs of case 2 from uniform randoms by distinguishing the last 2 + 1 coordinates from uniform randoms, can also distinguish outputs of case 4 from uniform randoms, which leads to a contradiction. This implies that distinguishes outputs of case 2 from uniform random by distinguishing the first 2 coordinates from uniform randoms. Hence, distinguishing the outputs of case 2 from uniform randoms over ({0, 1} ) 2 +3 is equivalent to distinguishing
where , 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ are uniformly random, from
where , for all = 1, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , are uniformly random. Let distinguish (2) from (3) with a non-negligible probability . We define the th hybrid distribution as
where , , , for all = 1, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , are uniformly random. Since | 0 − | ≥ , there exists such that | − +1 | ≥ / . Then, we can construct a distinguisher ′ by using such that ′ distinguishes from a random function R : {0, 1} → {0, 1} with non-negligible probability as follows. Upon an unknown distribution ( , ) ∈ ({0, 1} ) 2 , ′ generates the th hybrid distribution as
where 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , +1 , +1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , are uniformly random. Then, ′ queries the th hybrid distribution to . Since distinguishes the th hybrid distribution with non-negligible probability / , ′ distinguishes from R with non-negligible probability / , which contradicts the indistinguishability of . This contributes to Adv ( , ′ ) in inequality (1).
Formal Construction of Non-Adaptively Secure Function G
The function G is also defined from ({0, 1} ) 2 +3 to ({0, 1} ) 2 +3 with a secret G in . The notations and standard specifications of underlying primitives remain identical to those for the construction of F in the previous section. The formal construction of G is presented in Algorithm 2.
Claim 3.2. The function G is secure against any non-adaptive PPT adversary ( , ), running in time and making at most non-adaptive queries, where t and q are any polynomials of security parameter n.
Proof. To prove the non-adaptive security of G, we will also show that
where ′ = + ( , ) as defined in Claim 3.1 and Gen is a key generation algorithm for a family of DTPs. Since all the cases of G are identical except that the output of G in case (1) is a public key for trapdoor permutation , the first four terms on the RHS of (4) are identical to those in Lemma 3.1. Since the key is indistinguishable from uniform random over {0, 1} by the property of Gen, any PPT adversary distinguishes the key from uniform random over {1, 0} with only negligible advantage. Hence, the indistinguishability of dense keys constitutes Adv Gen ( , ′ ) in inequality (4).
Adaptive Insecurity of Parallel Composition of F and G
In this paper, a pseudo-random function is said to be breakable by adaptive queries if there is a PPT adversary such that distinguishes the pseudo-random function from a uniform random function by asking adaptive queries to the pseudo-random function.
Claim 3.3. The parallel composition function F ⊕ G is breakable by four adaptive queries.
4. If is not of any previous cases, then output ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 2 +3 ) where
Algorithm 2: The algorithm of function G Proof. To show the claim, we present a particular sequence of four adaptive queries in which the parallel composition F ⊕ G reveals all the secret keys of F and G, such as and . Let (or ) denote the th randomness of F (or G) upon the th adaptive query . Then, our first query Then, F computes hard-core bits by computing
So, F obtains a shared key ′ = 1 2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ . Finally, F computes fresh pseudo-random as
and outputs ( ′ ( 13 ), 13 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (2 +2)3 ). As 3 evokes case 2 of Algorithm 2, G retrieves ( , ) by computing Gen(1 , 11 ) where ( 11 , 21 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (2 +3)1 ) =˜ G ( 1 ). Then, G proceeds to compute the followings:
Using the trapdoor , G computes
Then, G can compute for ∀ = 1, 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ,
G constructs a shared key ′ by letting ′ = 1 2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ . Notice that 2 and ( + )2 are respectively equivalent to 2 and ( + )2 in F's computation at (6). Thus, G's ′ = F's ′ . Finally, G computes fresh pseudo-randoms as˜
and outputs ( ′ ( 13 ), 13 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (2 +2)3 ). Therefore, the output of F ⊕ G on the third input is
Our final adaptive input 4 to F ⊕ G is
Conditioned that all the previous adaptive queries are successful, consider the probability that
which reveals all of the secret keys of F and G.
By Claim 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, we immediately obtains the following lemma: Lemma 1. Suppose that a dense trapdoor permutation exists. Then, there exist non-adaptively secure functions F and G whose parallel composition F ⊕ G is breakable by four adaptive queries.
Sequential Composition Insecurity from Dense Trapdoor Permutation
We now present that a sequential composition of two non-adaptively secure functions does not imply the adaptive security in the presence of dense trapdoor permutation. We specifically construct nonadaptively secure pseudo-random functions F and G whose sequential composition reveals the secret keys of both component functions upon only three adaptive queries which is less by one adaptive query than the number of adaptive queries required for breaking the parallel composition in the previous section.
Intuitions of Sequential Composition of F and G
We provide the intuitive description of our counter-example functions F and G for which we provide the high-level overview of their formal constructions. The standard notions and specifications of the underlying primitives are identical to the ones in the previous section. F (resp. G) contains two secret keys F and ′ F (resp. G and ′ G ). In fact, in the following, the generation of secret key to be shared is simplified for the precise construction and clearer presentation. The secret is merely a pseudo-random string of leghth while in the previous section, the secret key was generated as the concatenation of hard-core prediates. We remark that the non-adaptive security of counter-example functions is not affected by this simplification.
We define the first adaptive query 1 to be a query, ( * , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) where * can be any arbitrary binary string of length . Then, F and G are defined on 1 as follows.
• F computes ( , ) by Gen(1 , P F ( * )), a pair of a public key defining a one-way permutation and its corresponding trapdoor for the inverse permutation. F also computes pseudo-random strings ( 11 , 21 , 31 , 41 , 51 ) by P F ( 1 ). F retrieves a alledged secret key F (from G) by computing −1 (0 ), which is the output of inverting the second coordinate of 1 with respect to the trapdoor . Then, F outputs ( , P F ( 31 ), 31 , 41 , 51 ).
• On ( , P F ( 31 ), 31 , 41 , 51 ), function G is defined to generate a pseudo-random string G by P G ( ) of length . First, G checks if a condition holds that the second coordinate of the input is the encryption of the third coordinate with respect to G . 
The computation of the sequential composition of F and G on 1 is described below:
We define our second adaptive query 2 to be the combination of the first adaptive input 1 and the output of the sequential composition on 1 such that 2 = ( * , ( G ), 21 , 31 ). On 2 , we define F and G as follows.
• F obtains the same pair of key and trapdoor ( , ) by Gen(1 , P F ( * )) as it did on 1 . Then, F retrieves the secret key G as it computes −1 ( G ). F computes pseudo-random strings ( 12 , 22 , 32 , 42 , 52 ) by executing P F ( 2 ). Thus, F outputs ( , P G ( 32 ), 32 , 42 , 52 ).
• Upon the input ( , P G ( 32 ), 32 , 42 , 52 ) from F, function G obtains the secret key G by computing P G ( ). Then, it check if the second coordinate of the input is the encryption of the third coordinate with repect to the obtained G . Since this truely holds, G is now convinced that the input from F was adaptively generated. Function G outputs ( ( G ), P G ( 32 ), 32 , 42 , P G ( ′ G )) where ( 12 , 22 , 32 , 42 , 52 ) is computed from the excution of P G ( , P G ( 32 ), 32 , 42 , 52 ).
All the individual outputs of F and G as a part of sequential composition are described as follows:
). Now we define our final adaptive query 3 to be ( * , ( G ), P G ( 32 ), 32 , P G ( ′ G )) which is the mixture of the first adaptive query and the outputs on the previous queries. Functions F and G are defined as follows.
• Again, F obtains the same pair of key and trapdoor ( , ) by Gen(1 , P F ( * )). F retrieves the secret key G by computing −1 ( G ). Then, by using the retrieved secret key G , F verifies that the third coordinate of 3 is the encryption of the four coordinate. Therefore, function F is also convinced that 3 is adaptively contructed and outputs (
G is obtained from the inversion of the final coordinate using G .
• Upon the input ( Below, the individual outputs of F and G as a part of sequential composition are described:
Formal Construction of Non-Adaptively Secure Function F
We first provie the underlying primitives and their standard specifications. In the following formal construction, we have two PRPs:
: {0, 1} → {0, 1} and˜ : {0, 1} 5 → {0, 1} 5 . Also, we are given a family of DTP (Gen(⋅, ⋅), , −1 ) which is indentical to the one given in Section 3.1.2. Function F is defined over {0, 1} 5 and internally contains two -bit secret seeds F and ′ F . The formal construction of F is given in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: The algorithm of function F Claim 3.4. The function F is secure against any non-adaptive PPT adversary ( , ), running in time and making at most non-adaptive queries, where t and q are any polynomials of security parameter n.
Proof. We need to prove that
where ′ = + ( , ), which accounts for the extra time costs resulting from our reduction. Let ∈ ({0, 1} ) 2 +3 for = 1, . . . , denote the th query that PPT non-adaptive adversary generates. Then, towards a contradiction, assume that distinguishes the outputs of F on 's from uniform random.
First we consider the case that a PPT adversary non-adaptively generate a query satisfying condition 1(a) that reveals all the secret keys of F. To satisfy the condition, the adversary must find a pair ( 3 , 4 ) such that
where F is a pseudo-random string of F. Finding such pairs is equivalent to quessing F with fixing ( 3 , 4 ) . Therefore, by using queries, the probability is /2 which constitutes the final term on the right hand side of (7).
Consider the queries that invoke the case 1(b). Unising the identical hybrid argument in the proofs of the previous section, we can prove that any PPT adversary, which distinguishes the output of case 1(b) from uniform random, also distinguishes from unform random the outputs of either , , or Gen. This constitutes the first three terms on the right hand side of (7), completing the proof.
Formal Construction of
Non-Adaptively Secure Function G Similarly to function F, function G is also defined over {0, 1} 5 and contains two -bit secret keys G and ′ G . The underlying primitives and standard notations are identical to those used to construct F. The formal definition of function G is provided in Algorithm 4.
Construction of G

For any = (
Algorithm 4: The algorithm of function G Claim 3.5. The function G is secure against any non-adaptive PPT adversary ( , ), running in time and making at most non-adaptive queries, where t and q are any polynomials of security parameter n.
Proof. To prove the claim, we will show the following inequality
where ′ = + ( , ), which accounts for the extra time costs resulting from our reduction. Let = ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (2 +3) ) ∈ ({0, 1} ) 2 +3 for = 1, 2, . . . , denote the th query that PPT non-adaptive adversary generates. Towards a contradiction, assume that PPT non-adaptive adversary distinguishes G from a uniform random function.
Consider the cases that a PPT adversary makes non-adaptive queries that satisfies conditions at 1(a) or 1(b) of Algorithm 4. Any output from these cases are not random. The outputs of 1(a) reveal all secret keys of function G. Notice that any output of 1(b) is not uniform random. That is, an adversary has an access to the dense trapdoor famaily, so the adversary generates its own pair of a public key and corresponding trapdoor. On any output of 1(b), the adversary can invert the first coordinate of the output by using its trapdoor and retrieve the secret key. It is easy to see that any speical relationships in the outputs will be revealed by using this obtained secret key. Similar to the previous section, the probability that non-adaptive queries evoke one of these cases is 2( /2 ) which is the final term on the right hand side of inequality (8).
Now, consider the case 1(c) to which any non-adaptive query belongs with overwhelming probability. By the identical hyprid argument in the prior sections, any PPT adversary that distinguishes the output of 1(c) from uniform random can be transformed to a PPT adversary that distinguishes the outputs of˜ or , constituting the first two terms on the right hand side of inequality (8). Therefore, the proof is complete. Proof. We will present three adaptive queries which reveals all the secrets of F and G (i.e., F and G ). In the following proof, let denote the th randomness of F generated in th query, and denote the th randomness of G on the th adaptive query. Also, for clarity, we denote F (resp. G ) as a shared secret key computed by F (resp. G) on the -th adaptive query. We define the first adaptive query 1 to be ( * , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) where * can be any string of length . Then, on 1 , F first computes a pseudo-random string F by F ( 1 ). Using this pseudorandom string, F obtains a key and its corresponding trapdoor ( , ) as it executes Gen(1 , F ). Then, F retrieves an suppposed secret key 1 F by computing the inverse permutation on the third coordinate of 1 as −1 (0 ) = 1 F . Since the condition at 1(a) does not hold with overwhelming probability, F outputs ( ,
F (with overwhelming probability), G outputs ( ( 1 G ), 21 , 31 , 41 , 51 ) where 21 , 31 , 41 and 51 are pseudo-random strings computed by G on the input.
The second adaptive query 2 is defined to be ( * , ( 1 G ), 0 , 0 , 0 ). As upon 1 , F obtains ( , ) since * is provided in 2 as well. F retrieves the shared key 2 F by executing 
). We define the final adaptive query 3 to be ( , ( 2 G ),
. On 3 , F computes the shared key F 3 which is simply 2 G as in the previous inputs. F verifies that
. On the input from F, function G finds out that the first coordinate equals one of its secret seeds. Therefore, G outputs ( G , ′ G , F , ′ F , 0 ) which reveals all of the secret seeds of F and G.
Proving Claim 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 substantiates the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Suppose that a dense trapdoor permutation exists. Then, there exist non-adaptively secure functions F and G whose sequential composition G(F(⋅)) is breakable by three adaptive queries.
Therefore, by Lemma 1 and 2, we immediately obtains the following theorem which concludes the impossibility of adaptively secure composition under the existence of DTP.
Theorem 6. If a dense trapdoor permutation exists, then the composition of non-adaptively secure functions does not imply the adaptive security.
Composition Insecurity vs. Uniform Transcript Key Agreement
In this section, we prove our main result: the existence of UTKA protocol implies the impossibility of obtaining adaptive security by the general composition of non-adaptively secure functions. Moreover, Pietrzak showed that the insecurity of sequential composition implies the existence of key agreement protocol. In fact, the key agreement protocol satisfies the property of uniform-transcript even though Pietrzak did not mention it in [Pie06] . For the whole equality between the impossibility of general adaptively secure composition and UTKA, we prove that the parallel composition insecurity also achieves a UTKA by using the similar technique to that in [Pie06] .
Parallel Composition Insecurity vs. Uniform Transcript Key Agreement
4.1.1 Constructing UTKA from the Adaptive Insecurity of F ⊕ G We present the parallel version of the result by using the technique originally presented by [Pie06] . That is, for ≥ 2, if the parallel composition of two − 1 adaptively secure functions is not -adaptively secure, then a (2 − 1)-pass key agreement exists. For clarity, we rather present a special case where = 2. Following the technique of [Pie06] , we construct a (2 − 1)-pass uniformtranscript bit agreement (UTBA) with -correlation and -security where is non-negligible and is overwhelming. It is known that parallel repetitions of bit agreement with -correlation and -security achieves a -bit key agreement without increasing the round complexity when is noticeable and is overwhelming [Hol05] . With non-negligible , a bit agreement still realizes a key agreement which achieves correctness for (infinitely many) such that for any , ≥ 1/ .
We present the pictorial description of a (2 − 1)-pass UTBA from two adaptively pseudorandom functions whose parallel composition is not -adaptively secure when = 2 in Protocol 2. The 3-pass UTBA in Protocol 2 may be easily extended to the (2 − 1)-pass UTBA for arbitrary and general adaptive distinguisher . We describe the above protocol and the extension in detail in the proof of following theorem.
Theorem 7. Let F and G be ( − 1)-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions. If the parallel composition F ⊕ G is NOT -adaptively secure, then a (2 − 1)-pass UTKA exists for ≥ 2.
Proof. We present the special case where = 2. Then, we explain how to generalize the technique for arbitrary . Let F and G be non-adaptively (2-adaptively) secure pseudo-random functions from × {0, 1} → {0, 1} where is the key space of F and G. Without loss of generality, we let be {0, 1} . Also, let Gen F and Gen G be the key generation algorithms from {1} to {0, 1} defined as Gen F (1 ) → for ∈ {0, 1} . In this proof, = since = {0, 1} . In Protocol 2, is a 2-adaptive distinguisher distinguishing F ⊕ G from a (uniform) random function R : {0, 1} → {0, 1} . Without loss of generality, , upon an input ( 1 , 2 ) for 1 , 2 ∈ {0, 1} , outputs 1 if and only if determines that the input is the output of a uniform random of length . Now we want to show that the protocol Bit-Agreement(1 ) in Protocol 2 has correlation
Protocol 2: 3-pass uniform-transcript bit agreement based on 2-adaptive distinguisher ( ) and is secure with probability ( ) where is non-negligible and is overwhelming given the security parameter . Furthermore, we want to prove that Bit-Agreement(1 ) satisfies the property of uniform-transcript. Therefore, parallel repetitions of Bit-Agreement(1 ) will achieve the n-bit Claim 4.1 (Non-negligible Correctness). The protocol Bit-Agreement(1 ) has non-negligible .
Proof. Let 1 , 2 , and 3 be bits defined as in the following three cases.
case 1 case 2 case 3
is a 2-adaptive distinguisher for F ⊕ G. This implies that there exists a non-negligible function ( ) for such that
Since R is a uniformly random function from {0, 1} to {0, 1} , for any 1 and 2 ∈ {0, 1} , the distribution of 1 ← R ( 1 ) and 2 ← R ( 2 ) is equivalent to the uniform random of length . In other words, the distribution of 2 and 3 are equivalent to one another:
Consider one more case described as follows.
2 ← 2 ⊕ G 1 ( 2 ) For any and key in {0, 1} , the distribution of is uniform if ← $ {0, 1} and ← ⊕ G ( ). Thus, the distribution of 1 and 2 are uniform, which implies that the distribution of 4 and 3 are equal to each other. Hence, by (10),
Finally, we have
by (9) and (11)
Therefore, the protocol Bit-Agreement(1 ) has non-negligible correlation in ( ).
Claim 4.2 (Security with overwhelming probability ). The protocol Bit-Agreement(1 ) has overwhelming .
Proof. We want to show that there exists an overwhelming function ( ) such that for all efficient distinguishers ∈ PPT and 's own randomness ,
Hence, it suffices to show that there exists an overwhelming ( ) such that
Consider the following five cases, which define the distributions of the transcript triplet ( 1 , 1 , 2 ).
case 1 case 2 case 3 case 4 case 5
2 ← F 1 ( 2 ) We define ( 1 , 1 , 2 ) to be the transcript triplet from the th case. Then, is defined as
By the non-adaptive security of G, 12 is negligible. Also, 23 is negligible due to the non-adaptive security of F. As we have seen in the proof of claim 4.1, case 3 is equivalent to case 4. Hence, 34 = 0. The non-adaptive security of G implies that 45 is negligible. Then we have, by triangle inequality,
Since 12 , 23 , and 45 are negligible, is negligible in . We define to be 1 − . It is easy to see that is overwhelming in since is negligible. Finally, we complete the proof of claim 4.2 as
Claim 4.3 (Uniform-transcript). The protocol Bit-Agreement(1 ) is a uniform-transcript bit agreement.
Proof. Notice that the value of 1 is related to the value of 1 in the protocol, and as long as 1 is uniformly random, 1 is also uniformly random. Let R denote a uniformly random vector in ({0, 1} ) . Therefore, we want to show the following inequality for any PPT adversary (distinguisher) .
Then we define two games in which adversary distinguishes a transcript from uniform random. Game 0 is for an adversary to distinguish ( 1 , 1 , 2 ) from R 3 while A = 0, and game 1 is for an adversary to distinguish ( 1 , 1 , 2 ) from R 3 while A = 1. We denote the advantage of adversary in 0 and 1 as Adv 0 and Adv 1 , respectively. Winning 0 (or 1 ) means that one distinguishes ( 1 , 1 , 2 ) from R 3 with a non-negligible advantage in 0 (or 1 ). Finally, suppose that there exists a PPT adversary that wins either of the games.
In game 1 , since both 1 and 2 are randomly chosen from {0, 1} , distinguishing ( 1 , 1 , 2 ) from R 3 is equivalent to distinguishing ( 1 , ( 2 ), 3 ) from R 3 . Hence, if wins 1 , it also distinguishes G from uniform random functions with non-negligible advantage. This is clearly impossible by the non-adaptive security of G.
Assume that wins game 0 by distinguishing, with non-negligible probability,
from a uniform random triplet R 3 for ← $ {0, 1} . Consider the following distributions.
(1) :
for 1 and 2 ← $ {0, 1} .
(2) :
where 5 = 3 ⊕ 4 for 1 , 2 , 3 and 4 ← $ {0, 1} . Since distinguishes Dist(0) from Dist(3) with non-negligible advantage, distinguishes Dist( ) from Dist( ) for ∕ = with non-negligible probability. This is clearly a contradiction since the above distributions only negligibly deviate from each other by the non-adaptive security of both F and G.
Therefore, the advantage of to distinguish the transcript from R 3 is Adv 0 /2+Adv 1 /2 which is negligible since both Adv 0 and Adv 1 are negligible. This directly validates the inequality (13).
With Claims 4.1 and 4.2, we showed that the protocol Bit-Agreement(1 ) has non-negligible correlation and is secure with overwhelming probability . Also, we show the indistinguishability of messages from randoms with Claim 4.3. Thus, this implies the existence of a uniform-transcript key agreement. We eventually show that the ( − 1)-adaptively secure parallel composition implies the existence of the (2 − 1)-pass uniform-transcript key agreement for the case = 2 with respect to a 2-adaptive distinguisher. We will generalize the same technique to the arbitrary .
We just showed that the ( − 1)-adaptively secure parallel composition implies the (2 − 1)-pass uniform-transcript bit agreement for the case = 2. However, notice that the 2-adaptive distinguisher , which we use to build Bit-Agreement(1 ), is not a general 2-adaptive distinguisher since makes two adaptive queries. However, it is easy to see that we can construct the same 3-pass bit agreement protocol based on a general 2-adaptive distinguisher denoted by , where is the any polynomial size of blocks queried by the distinguisher. Then, we build the same 3-pass uniform-transcript bit-agreement by replacing 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 with 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 in the
Protocol 3: (2 − 1)-pass uniform-transcript bit agreement based on a general -adaptive distinguisher Bit-Agreement(1 ), where , , are tuples. That is, = ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ) for . Now we are ready to generalize the construction of Bit-Agreement(1 ) to the arbitrary ≥ 2. Denote as a -adaptive distinguisher with the query block of size . Then, , , are defined by -tuples for all as before. We provide the construction in Protocol 3. Obviously, we can extend the arguments of Claim 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 to the (2 − 1)-pass uniform transcript bit-agreement. To prove that the above bit agreement is secure with overwhelming probability, only the number of intermediate cases between the distributions of transcripts is increased according to the increased number of rounds. This completes the proof of Theorem 7.
Intuitions of Adaptively Insecure Parallel Composition of F and G under UTKA
A -round uniform-transcript key agreement protocol ( -UTKA), denoted by Φ = (A, B) , is a uniform-transcript key agreement protocol consisting of two sub-protocols A and B, in which Alice (using A) and Bob (using B) exchange 2 messages to each other ( messages from each party) in order to share a secret key .
We first provide the intuitive description of the parallel version of -UTKA in Protocol 4, which we will use to construct counter-example functions. Notice that Alice and Bob are symmetric to each other in Protocol 4. In particular, Bob's first message is completely independent of Alice's first message and is only dependent on his own private randomness. 2 Now, we provide a high-level overview of our pseudo-random functions F and G from -UTKA 2 The main reason for using this parallel version of -UTKA is that it is easier to emulate the key agreement protocol in the context of parallel composition of our proposed counter-example pseudo-random functions F and G. Also, it provides us with a tighter bound on the number of adaptive queries required to break the adaptive security of the parallel composition. It is possible to construct the counter-example functions to show the same composition insecurity result by using − in which Bob's first message is dependent on Alice's first message. However, it requires more adaptive queries to break the parallel composition of such functions.
Alice
Transcript Bob
Protocol 4: Parallel version of -UTKA and describe how to break the adaptive security of their parallel composition. For underlying primitives, we have a black-box access to Φ = (A, B), -UTKA described in Protocol 2. and denote the th message computed by A and B respectively. We are give a pseudo-random private-key encryption scheme (Enc, Dec) such that Dec (Enc ( )) = . Finally, let P be any given adaptively secure PRP.
Intuitively, F utilizes A as its subroutine as well as G utilizes B as its subroutine in order for them to share a secret key via input and outputs. Then, F and G create a specially related pseudo-random strings with respect to the shared secret key. As we input the specially related pseudo-random strings to the parallel composition, the functions retrieve the shared key, verify the special relation hidden in the input query, and reveal their secret keys in their outputs. F and G internally contain secret keys F and G . F and G are defined over ({0, 1} ) +2 .
First, we define F and G upon the first adaptive (fixed) query 1 = (0 , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ) as:
• F generates + 2 pseudo-random strings F , 21 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2)1 by P F ( 1 ). F creates Alice's first message 1 by A 1 ( F ) and then outputs ( 1 , 21 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2)1 ).
• G does the same as it generates G , 21 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2)1 by P F ( 1 ), and then computes Bob's first message 1 by B 1 ( G ), and outputs ( 1 , 21 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2)1 ).
Below we depict the individual outputs of F and G on 1 and their parallel composition:
Inductively, for 2 ≤ ≤ , we define F and G to process the -th adaptive query
• F first regenerates F and 1 by simulating the first-round computation. That is, F first computes P F ( 1 ) to obtain F and then executes A( F ). Then, F processes the following chain of computations in the direction of left-to-right and top-to-bottom with F , 1 and ,
Finally, F outputs ( , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2) ) where 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2) are fresh pseudo-random strings generated by P F ( ).
• G is symmetrically defined. That is, we have the description G on by replacing all of F, , A, and in the above description with G, , B, and . Hence, G outputs ( , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2) ) where 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2) are generated by P G ( ).
On
for 2 ≤ ≤ , we demonstrate the individual outputs of F and G and the output of their parallel composition below.
Hence, we obtain ⊕ by feeding the parallel composition of F and G with to be
The ( + 1)th adaptive query is defined to be
. Then, we define our functions F and G on +1 as follows.
• F first regenerates F and 1 by simulating the first-round computation as before. Then, F performs the chain of computations described above, and so obtains 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , . Hence, F can generate a shared key sk by A +1 ( F , 1 , 2 , . . . , ). F generates pseudo-random strings
• G is symmetrically defined. So, G outputs (Enc ( 1( +1) ), 1( +1) , 3( +1) , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2)( +1) ).
The following describes the each output of F and G, and that of parallel composition on +1 .
The final ( + 2)th adaptive query is defined to be
) which is the combination of all the outputs of the parallel composition on the previous adaptive queries. Then, F and G are defined on +2 as follows.
• F executes the chain of computations to retrieve 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , then computes a shared key sk by A +1 ( F , 1 , 2 , . . . , ). Since +1 = ( 1 ⊕ 1 , 2 ⊕ 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ⊕ , 0 , 0 ), F can obtain Enc ( 1( +1) ) and 1( +1) generated by the internal simulation of F( +1 ). F checks to see if equality Dec (Enc ( 1( +1) )⊕(Enc ( 1( +1) )⊕Enc ( 1( +1) ))) = 1( +1) ⊕( 1( +1) ⊕ 1( +1) ) holds where (Enc ( 1( +1) ) ⊕ Enc ( 1( +1) )) and ( 1( +1) ⊕ 1( +1) ) are obtained from +2 . As the equality holds, F is convinced that +2 is indeed an adaptively generated query. Hence, F outputs ( F , 0 , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ).
• G is symmetrically defined. Hence, G similarly outputs (0 , G , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ).
Below we provide the overall picture of the individual computations of F and G and the output of their parallel composition.
Formal Construction of Non-Adaptively Secure Functions F and G
The underlying primitives used for the construction of F and G are two PRPs,˜ : ×({0, 1} ) +2 → ({0, 1} ) +2 and : × {0, 1} → {0, 1} , where is key space {0, 1} . Also, we are given a black-box access to the parallel version of -UTKA denoted by Φ = (A, B) described in Section 4.1.2.
We formally define our non-adaptively secure pseudo-random function F to map from ({0, 1} ) +2 to ({0, 1} ) +2 . Furthermore, F internally possesses a secret key F ∈ . The formal definition of function F is provided in Algorithm 5.
The construction of G is symmetric to F. That is, replacing F, A, , and ( F , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ) in Algorithm 5 with G, B, , and (0 , G , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ) respectively will provide us with the formal construction of G.
Claim 4.4. The functions F and G are secure against any non-adaptive PPT adversary ( , ), running in time and making at most non-adaptive queries, where t and q are any polynomials of security parameter n.
Proof. By hybrid argument, we reduce the security of function F to the indistinguishability of the underlying PRPs and the -UTKA. Let be a PPT adversary making queries and running for time . Notice that F and G are structurally identical to one another. Hence, it suffices to show that F is non-adaptively secure. To prove the claim, we will show the following inequality.
First, assume that to obtain the secret key F , makes queries of the form in ( 1 ∕ = 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , +2 ∕ = 0 ) evoking case 2 of Algorithm 5. Then, let fix the first queries to be the same through the queries. This implies that F , 1 , and 2 are fixed in the condition
in the case 2(c) of Algorithm 5. This only helps the adversary by allowing it to choose +1 and +2 to satisfy the condition. Since is a permutation, there uniquely exists +1 for each +2 , which satisfies the condition. Hence,
Since makes queries, the probability of successfully finding a pair of such +1 and +2 is /2 , which constitutes the final term of the inequality (14).
Consider that makes queries that fall into case 2(c), 2(d), and 3 of Algorithm 5. As we showed above, non-adaptive queries can satisfy the condition in 2(c) with only negligible probability. Thus, assume that all the queries made here do not satisfy the condition. Hence, F outputs, upon queries,
where is the th coordinate of the th query for 1 ≤ ≤ + 2 and 1 ≤ ≤ .
Construction of F
3. If the input is not any of above cases, then
Algorithm 5: The algorithm of function F Proceeding by hybrid argument, assume that distinguishes (15) from uniform distributions with a non-negligible probability ,
Consider the th hybrid,
Then we can build a PPT distinguisher using as a sub-routine. With an unknown distribution from ({0, 1}) +2 , constructs and queries ( ) to . Since distinguishes F from a uniform random function with the probability , will distinguish˜ from a uniform random function with the probability , which is non-negligible.
Consider that makes queries in the form of
, that provoke case 2(b) of F in Algorithm 5. Then, the corresponding outputs can be written as,
is computed by A +1 ( , Trans A ) for unknown . distinguishing the above distribution from uniform random implies that one of the following two cases must be true. First, the adversary distinguishes the last + 1 coordinates (all coordinates except for the first coordinate) of the outputs from uniform random. Second, the first two coordinates from uniform random. Assume that the first case is true. Then, can distinguish all the output of F upon queries of case 2(c)ii, 2(d) or 3 by simply ignoring the second coordinate of the outputs. This is clearly a contradiction to the non-adaptive security of F in those cases proven above. Assume that the second case holds. Distinguishing the first two coordinates of the outputs from uniform random is equivalent to distinguishing,
where ← $ {0, 1} for 1 ≤ ≤ , from the uniform distribution,
where and ← $ {0, 1} for 1 ≤ ≤ . Suppose that distinguishes (17) from (18) with a non-negligible probability . Define a hybrid distribution as
where and ← $ {0, 1} for 1 ≤ ≤ . Since distinguishes (17) from (18) with probability , | 0 − | ≥ , there exists s.t.
Upon an unknown distribution ( , ) ∈ ({0, 1} ) 2 , we can build a distinguisher , which determines whether ( , ) comes from (17) or from (18) with a non-negligible probability as queries (( , )) to . Therefore, distinguishes from a uniform random function with a non-negligible probability.
Consider that makes queries in the form of ( 1 ∕ = 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ∕ = 0 , +1 = 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , +2 = 0 ) for < . That is, all the queries fall into case 1 or 2(a) of Algorithm 5. By replacing in the above hybrid argument with A, we can also show that if breaks the indistinguishability of F, then we can construct a PPT distinguisher , which breaks the indistinguishability of messages.
Adaptive Insecurity of Parallel Composition of F and G
Claim 4.5. The parallel composition F ⊕ G is breakable by +2 adaptive queries.
Proof. Let denote the th randomness upon the th input. To initiate the key agreement, our first special input is (0 , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ). Then, F gets into case 1 of Algorithm 5 and computes its first message 1 and outputs ( 1 , 21 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2)1 ). So does G. Hence, the output of the parallel composition on the first input query is
Our second adaptive query is 2 = ( 1 ⊕ 1 , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ), where 1 ⊕ 1 comes from the output of the parallel composition on 1 . 2 evokes the case 2 of Algorithm 5 unless 1 ⊕ 1 = 0 . The only case that 1 ⊕ 1 = 0 is 1 = 1 which occurs with negligible probability. By the computations of "For" loop of case 2, F obtains 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , +1 as follows.
Before entering For loop
Since the first coordinate is the only non-zero coordinate, 2 evokes case (a) of case 2 after the For loop. Hence, function F outputs ( 1 , 22 , 32 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2)2 ) where ( 12 , 22 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2)2 ) is generated by˜ F ( 2 ). G undertakes the identical course of computation, so it outputs ( 2 , , 22 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2)2 ).
Inductively, for 2 ≤ ≤ , our th adaptive query to the parallel composition is defined as
where ⊕ is obtained from the output of F on . Then, the output of the parallel composition on is
where ( 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2) ) is generated by˜ F ( ) and ( 1 , . . . , ( +2) ) is generated by˜ G ( ). Hence, the th adaptive query (the final case of the above inductive cases) is = ( 1 ⊕ 1 , 2 ⊕ Now, we define our ( + 1)th adaptive query as
0 ) which evokes case 2. Again, F retrives 1 by computing F ( 1 ). F performs the computations of For loop as follows.
's first coordinates are adaptively generated from the previous adaptive queries and non-zero with overwhelming probability, +1 is a properly computed shared key, F and +1 evokes case 2(b). Thus, F outputs (
) is generated from˜ F ( +1 ). On +1 , G also performs the identical course of computations, so it outputs ( G ( 1( +1) ), 1( +1) , 2( +1) , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +1)( +1) ). Hence, the output of the parallel composition on +1 is
The final ( + 2)th adaptive query is defined as
On +2 , F obtains the shared key F by simulating the previous round computation with the first coordinates of +2 . +2 evokes case 2(c) of Algorithm 5 as the final two coordinates of +2 are non-zero with overwhelming probability. Now F computes 1 and 2 by simulating the output of the previous round of itself such that ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 2 ) is the output from
Then, F verifies that equality
by (23)and (22) = −1
by (24)and (22) Therefore, F outputs ( F , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ). Similarly, G performs the same course of computation as does F, so it outputs (0 , G , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ). Therefore, the final output of the parallel composition is ( F , G , 0 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 0 ) which reveals all the secret keys of F and G. In this section, we briefly review the main idea behind Pietrzak's construction of key agreement, which is achieved from two pseudo-random functions whose sequential composition is not adaptively secure. Let us have two secure functions F and G such that their sequential composition G(F(⋅)) is broken by a distinguisher with -adaptive queries. Alice chooses her secret bit in which Bob will eventually know what bit is. If = 1, Alice obtains the first (starting) adaptive input from , and sends Bob the cypher-text of the first input, encrypted by F. Bob simply computes G( ) and sends it back to Alice. Then, Alice again uses to get an (the second) adaptive input based on G( ) and repeats the same process. If = 0, then Alice simply chooses and sends a uniformly random string to Bob (every time) and Bob follows the same procedure as described above. As this process is performed repeatedly times, at the end Bob obtains adaptive outputs on which outputs a bit consistent with Alice's secret bit with non-negligible probability. Hence, Bob obtains with non-negligible probability. The pictorial description of the protocol is provided in Protocol 5. In fact, his bit agreement protocol satisfies the property of uniform-transcript. We prove this as
Protocol 5: [Pie06] 3-pass bit agreement based on 2-adaptive distinguisher a separate claim and formally restate Pietrzak's theorem below. Proof. To show that the protocol Bit-Agreement(1 ) has uniform transcript, we prove that for any PPT adversary ,
where ( ) is a negligible function in . First, we define two games for adversary to distinguish transcript from random string. Game 0 is for the adversary to distinguish ( 1 , 1 , 2 ) from R 3 when A = 0, and game 1 is for the adversary to distinguish ( 1 , 1 , 2 ) from R 3 when A = 1. Then we denote the advantage of adversary in 0 and 1 as Adv 0 and Adv 1 , respectively. Finally, suppose that there exists a PPT adversary winning either of the games with non-negligible probability.
In game 1 , since both 1 and 2 are randomly chosen from {0, 1} , the advantage for the adversary to distinguish ( 1 , 1 , 2 ) from R 3 is equivalent to the advantage of distinguishing ( * , G( * )) from ( 1 , 2 ) where * , 1 , 2 are all uniformly random. Hence, by winning game 1 , distinguishes ( * , G( * )) from ( 1 , 2 ) with non-negligible probability. This is an obvious contraction to the non-adaptive security of G.
Now consider the game 0 . Assume that a PPT adversary wins the game by distinguishing, with non-negligible probability,
from a random triplet R 3 for ← $ {0, 1} . Then, consider the following distributions.
(2) : ( 1 , 2 , F( ( 2 ))) for 1 and 2 ← $ {0, 1} .
(3) : ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) = R 3 for 1 , 2 and 3 ← $ {0, 1} .
Since distinguishes Dist(0) from Dist(3) with non-negligible probability, distinguishes two of the intermediate distributions, Dist( ) and Dist( ), for ∕ = , with non-negligible probability. This is clearly a contradiction since the above distributions only negligibly deviate from each other by the the non-adaptive security of F and G.
The advantage of to distinguish the transcript from R 3 is Adv 0 /2 + Adv 1 /2 which is negligible since both Adv 0 and Adv 1 are negligible. Thus, inequality (25) holds.
Theorem 10 ( [Pie06] ). Let F and G be ( − 1)-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions. If the sequential composition G(F(⋅)) is NOT -adaptively secure, then a (2 -1)-pass UTKA exists for ≥ 2.
Intuitions of Adaptively Insecure Sequential Composition of F and G under UTKA
In the following description of building our counter-example functions, we use the sequential version of -UTKA in which Bob's first message is dependent on Alice's first message. That is, Bob must wait for the first message 1 from Alice in order to compute his first message 1 . See Protocol 6 for the overview of sequetial -UTKA.
Protocol 6: Sequential version of -UTKA Now, we present the high-level overview on our constructions of counter-example functions F and G based on -UTKA described above. For the building blocks, we are given a sequential version of -UTKA, Φ = (A, B) and all the other primitives remain identical to the ones in Section 4.1. F (resp. G) is defined over ({0, 1} ) +3 and internally possesses two secret keys F and F ′ (resp. G and G ′ ). Our first adaptive query is an arbitrary vector in ({0, 1} ) +3 as 1 = ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , +2 , * ) for 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , +2 , * ← $ {0, 1} . On 1 , we define F and G as follows.
• F computes a pseudo-random string F by P F ( * ). Then, F generates the first message 1 by executing A 1 ( F ). F continues to compute 21 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 1 by executing A 2 ( F , 1 ), ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , A ( F , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , −1 ). Notice that 1 is an arbitrarily chosen input so that running A (Alice) on 1 produces only pseudo-random strings except for the first message 1 . F computes its first -bit shared key
+2 . The equality is satisfied only negligible probability since +1 and +2 are arbitrary chosen. Hence, with overwhelming probability, F concludes its computation by outputting
) where ( +1)1 , ( +2)1 and ( +3)1 are generated from P F ( +1 , +2 , +3 ).
• On F( 1 ), G is defined to compute 1 by B 1 ( G , 1 ) where G is generated by P G ( 1 ) and 1 is the first message validly generated by F. G continues to compute 21 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 1 by executing B 2 ( G , 1 , 21 ), ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , B ( G , 1 , 21 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 1 ). Since 21 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 1 are pseudo-random strings computed by F upon non-adaptive query 1 , 21 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 1 are pseudo-random strings.
holds. This equality holds with only negligible probability. G computes pseudo-random strings
We describe the outputs of F and G in the computation of their sequential composition on 1 :
Inductively, for 2 ≤ ≤ − 1, the th adaptive query is in the form of ( 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , −1 , ( −1) , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( −1) , ( +1)( −1) , ( +2)( −1) , * ) where * is the final coordinate of 1 and the rest of coordinates are the first 2 + 2 coordinates in the output of G (F( −1 )) . Then, F computes all the messages 1 to and shared key F based on as described above. F tests if Dec
with overwhelming probability since the keys are computed based on insufficient number of valid messages. Hence, ( +3) ). Similarly, G undertakes the same course of computations: G computes messages and shared key, tests the equality and finally outputs (
). The individual output of F and the output of G in their sequential composition on are described as follows:
Hence, after the ( − 1)th adaptive query, our th adaptive query is ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , −1 ,
On , we define F and G as follows.
• F computes F from P F ( * ). Then, F internally regenerates all by A ( F , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , −1 ) for 1 ≤ ≤ and shared key F by A ( F , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , −1 , ( −1) ). F is still a merely pseudo-random string since ( −1) is not a proper message. F performs the equality test Dec
which fails with overwhelming probability. Hence,
• G obtains G by P G ( 1 ). Then, since G obtains its complete set of messages 's from F, function G correctly generates all the messages 's by executing B ( G , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ) for all 1 ≤ ≤ . In addition, G computes the shared key G from executing B +1 ( G , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ). Notice that the obtained shared key G is a correct key which is generated upon valid messages. However, when G tests if Dec
, the test fails with overwhelming probability since F is not valid. Finally,
We describe the overall picture of F and G in their sequential composition on input below:
The ( + 1)th adaptive query +1 is defined to be ( 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , ( +1) , ( +2) , * ). On +1 , we define functions F and G on +1 as:
• F now obtains all the messages 's from +1 so that it can compute all the messages 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , and the shared key +1 F by executing A +1 ( F , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ). F tests if the following equality is satisfied:
both keys are computed on each complete set of messages. However, since ( +1)( ) and ( +2)( ) are both mere pseudo-random strings, the test fails. Finally, F outputs ( 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , are computed from the complete sets of messages, they must be equal. G is convinced that the query from F is adaptively generated. Therefore, G outputs (
The overall description of outputs of F and G on the final adaptive query is provided below:
We define the final ( + 2)th adaptive query +2 to be defined by
, Functions F and G on +1 are defined as follows:
• F can compute 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , as it did upon +1 and the shared key
= G in which both keys are computed on each complete set of messages, so the equality holds. F is now convinced that 2 is an adaptive query. Therefore, F outputs (
• On ( The overall description of outputs of F and G on the final adaptive query is provided below:
Formal Construction of Non-Adaptively Secure Function F
We use three underlying primitives for the construction of F: PRP : × {0, 1} → {0, 1} , PRP : × ({0, 1} ) 3 → ({0, 1} ) 3 where key space is {0, 1} and -UTKA Φ = (A, B) described in Section 4.2.2. We define function F : ({0, 1} ) +3 → ({0, 1} ) +3 to emulate the A of Φ via a black-box access to A. In addition, we define F to internally retain two private keys F and ′ F of length . The formal construction is presented in Algorithm 6.
Claim 4.7. The function F is secure against any non-adaptive PPT adversary ( , ), running in time and making at most non-adaptive queries, where t and q are any polynomials of security parameter n.
Proof. We prove this claim by showing that
1. For any = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , +3 ), then Output ( 1 , 2 , . . . , +3 ) where
Algorithm 6: The algorithm of function F where ′ = + ( ), which accounts for the extra time costs resulting from our reduction. Let be a PPT adversary making non-adaptive queries to function F. Since F on the same input query outputs the same output vector, assume that does not input the same query twice. Let 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , denote the non-adaptive queries that generates. Consider the event that a non-adaptive query evokes case 1(a)i of Algorithm 6. That is, for some ∈ [1, ], = ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , +3 ) satisfies the condition of 'if statement' at the beginning of 1(a):
is computed by A on 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , and an initial random string denoted by F in Algorithm 6. Since F picks a pseudo-random string generated from F ( +3 ) for the initial random string,
does not know what F is as well as what the shared key is. Therefore, in order to evoke case 1(a)i (so the corresponding output reveals the secret key of F), merely guesses +1 and +2 such that +2 = −1 ( +1 ). Since is a permutation, there uniquely exists +1 for given +2 satisfying the condition. Therefore, the probability of each succeeding to evoke case 1(a)i is 1/2 . Consequently, the success probability would be /2 with asking non-adaptive queries, which is negligible in security parameter . This case analysis accounts for the final term of inequality (26).
Consider the case that a non-adaptive query evokes case 1(a)i of Algorithm 6, which happens with overwhelming probability. We point out that the distribution of the outputs of case 1(a)i of Algorithm 6 is identical to a mixture of the distribution of the outputs of 2(a) and 2(b) of Algorithm 5. By the identical hybrid argument, it is easy to see that any PPT adversary, distinguishing outputs of case 1(a)i of Algorithm 6 from uniform random, can also distinguish˜ , or A from uniform random functions. This constitutes the first three terms on the right hand side of inequality (26), which completes the proof. 
Algorithm 7: The algorithm of function G Claim 4.8. The function G is secure against any non-adaptive PPT adversary ( , ), running in time and making at most non-adaptive queries, where t and q are any polynomials of security parameter n.
Proof. We reduce the security of function G to the indistinguishability of ,˜ , the security of -UTKA Φ , and the probability of guessing secret key by showing the following inequality:
where ′ = + ( ), which accounts for the extra time costs resulting from our reduction. Suppose that a PPT adversary generates non-adaptive queries over ({0, 1} ) +3 . Then, consider the case that a non-adaptive query = ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , +3 ) evokes case 1(a)i or 1(b)i of Algorithm 7, which reveals the secret keys of G. It is easy to see that A can make only a mere guess on +1 and +2 such that +2 = −1 ( +1 ), which succeeds with probability 1/2 . Also, the probability that the first coordinate of a non-adaptive query equals G ′ is 1/2 . Hence, the total probability that non-adaptive query evoke case 1(a)i or 1(b)i is (1/2 + 1/2 ), which is the final term on the right hand side of inequality (27).
Hence, any non-adaptive query evokes 1(b)ii of Algorithm 7 with overwhelming probability. Notice that the distribution of the outputs in this case is generated only by either B or˜ . As the hybrid argument is used similarily to the previous section, we can easily prove that distinguishing the outputs of case 1(b)ii of Algorithm 7 from uniform random implies distinguishing B and˜ from uniform random functions, which account for Adv˜ ( , ′ ) and Adv ( , ′ ) of inequality (27).
Adaptive Insecurity of Sequential Composition of F and G
Claim 4.9. The sequential composition G(F(⋅)) is breakable by + 2 adaptive queries.
Proof. To prove the claim, we will present a particular sequence of + 1 adaptive queries and describe how to adaptively build them. For the standard notation, let = ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ( +2) ) be the th adaptive input query. For the clarity of proof, we define 'valid' and 'invalid' messages and shared keys as follows. We define the the first 'valid' message generated from function F (as Alice by using A), denoted by 1 to be the output of A 1 ( F ) where F is the initial random string picked by F as F executes PRP F on a coordinate of the input query. Similarly, we define the first 'valid' message generated from function G (as Bob by using B) denoted by to be B 1 ( G , 1 ). Inductively for 2 ≤ ≤ , we define the th valid message message of F (resp. G) to be the output of A ( F , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , −1 ) (resp. B ( G , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ,  ) ). Finally, we define a valid shared key of F (resp. G) denoted by F (resp. G ) to be A +1 ( F , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ) (resp. B +1 ( G , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , )). We define the th 'invalid' messages and 'invalid' shared key of F to be the output of A ( F , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , −1 ) for 2 ≤ ≤ + 1 where there exists such that ∕ = . We define the th 'invalid' messages and 'invalid' shared key of F, respectively denoted by and F , to be the output of A ( F , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , −1 ) for 2 ≤ ≤ + 1 where there exists such that ∕ = . Similarly, we define the th 'invalid' messages of G, denoted by , to be the output of B ( G , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ) for 1 ≤ ≤
where there exists such that ∕ = . Finally, we define the 'invalid' shared key of G, denoted by G , to be the output of B +1 ( G , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ) where there exists 1 ≤ ≤ such that ∕ = .
Recall that all the messages generated by A and B are indistinguishable from uniform random over {0, 1} due to the uniform transcript property of UTKA Φ = (A, B) regardless of the validity of the messages.
Our first adaptive query to G(F(⋅)) can be any random vector in ({0, 1} ) +3 . Let us define the first query to be
On 1 , F computes a random seed F ← F ( * ) for the initiation of key agreement. Then, F first computes 1 ← A 1 ( F ) and then computes the following.
2
←A 2 ( F , 1 )
3
←A 3 ( F , 1 , 2 ) . . .
The above computations produce only invalid messages and shared key since 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , are randomly chosen. That is, = for all with overwhelming probability. F checks if 
Inductively, for all 2 ≤ ≤ , the th adaptive query is of the following form:
= ( 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , −1 , , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , 1( −1) , 2( −1)
).
On , F undertakes the course of computations identical to those on 1 . In the same way, G performs the same computations as on F( 1 ) described above. Hence, the output of the sequential composition on is
By (31), the th adaptive query is = ( 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , −1 , , 1( −1) , 2( −1),
On , F obtains the initial randomness F ← F ( * ). Then, F computes all the messages and shared key based on as follows:
2 ←A 2 ( F , 1 ) . . .
Again, F checks if
( 1( −1) )) = 1( −1) . Since the equality is not true with overwhelming probability, F computes ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) ←˜ F ( G ( 1( −1) ), 1( −1) , 2( −1) ). Finally, F outputs the following:
( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ,
On (34), G also obtains its initial randomness G ← G ( 1 ) for key agreement. Notice that (34) contains all the valid messages 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , G can compute all the valid messages and shared key as follows:
2 ←B 2 ( G , 1 , 2 ) . . .
Theorem 12. The sequential composition of two pseudo-random functions does not imply adaptive security if and only if the uniform-transcript key agreement exists.
As we have proved the equivalence in the contexts of both parallel and sequential compositions by Theorem 9 and Theorem 12 respectively, we immediately obtain the following theorem which is our main theorem.
Theorem 13. The composition of two pseudo-random functions does not imply adaptive security if and only if the uniform-transcript key agreement exists.
Impossibility of Adaptively Secure Self-Composition
Self-composition is a composition of two or more copies of a single function. For instance, we call F(F(⋅)) the sequential self-composition of function F, and F ⊕ F the parallel self-composition of function F. Note that several copies of identical F's must contain independent secret seeds. That is, each copy of F's must be allowed to be independently drawn from its function family.
So far, we proved the equivalence relation between the insecurity of composition and UTKA protocols. In fact, when we mention the insecurity of composition in previous sections, the main argument is rather that, given a non-adaptively secure function, there might be another nonadaptively secure function such that their composition is adaptively insecure. We call this type of composition general-composition. Hence, we still have a lingering unanswered question of whether the self-composition of a non-adaptively secure function implies the unconditional adaptive security. We answered the question negatively as follows.
Suppose that we are given non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions F and G ′ , without loss of generality, both defined over {0, 1} such that their parallel (general-)composition (F ⊕ G)(⋅) is adaptively insecure. Note that and ′ are independently chosen secret seeds for pseudo-random functions. That is, there exists a PPT adversary with an adaptive adversarial strategy which succeeds in breaking the security of (F ⊕ G)(⋅) with non-negligible probability . Now, we define a function family ℱ ( , ) : {0, 1} → {0, 1} on input string by
where and are private seeds. It is easy to see that function ℱ(⋅) is also non-adaptively secure due to the non-adaptive security of functions F and G. This trivially leads to
To break the adaptive security of (ℱ ⊕ ℱ)(⋅), it suffices to draw two copies of functions from the family at random and then use the same adaptively adversarial strategy of as follows: the first bit of seeds of F and G differ in their first bit with probability 1/2. Therefore, if we draw two independent ℱ's, then ℱ ⊕ ℱ is equivalent to F ⊕ G with probability 1/4 which is adaptively insecure.
Informally, by the above construction of ℱ from any two non-adaptively secure functions F and G such that their parallel composition is not adaptively secure, we actually show that the adaptive insecurity of the parallel general-composition implies the adaptive insecurity of the parallel selfcomposition. We formally state this as follows.
